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Abstract
In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information
about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market
power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply
function equilibrium. We find that with uncorrelated costs observed behavior is close
to the theoretical benchmark. However, with interdependent costs and precise private
signals, market power does not raise above the case of uncorrelated costs contrary to the
theoretical prediction. This is consistent with subjects not being able to make inferences
from the market price when costs are interdependent. We find that this effect is less severe
when private signals are noisier.
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1 Introduction
We present the results of a laboratory experiment that examines the relationship between in-
formation frictions and market power in markets characterized by supply function competition.
Information frictions have been found to be important in a number of markets with competition
in schedules.1 In our experimental markets, each seller has incomplete information about her
own cost and others’ costs and receives a private signal about own cost. On the basis of this
information sellers compete in supply functions. Our experiment is fundamentally theory-based,
but the setting is related to that of real-world markets characterized by competition in demand
or supply schedules such as wholesale electricity markets, markets for pollution permits, or liq-
uidity and Treasury auctions. Understanding what factors contribute to the existence of market
power is a central issue and this is an area to which experimental economics can contribute.
Specifically, in our laboratory study we can separately vary different elements of the information
structure to study their causal impact on market power, something which is difficult with other
types of empirical data.
Our design is based on Vives (2011), which structures a wide range of competitive environ-
ments where agents compete in schedules with private information, providing a tractable model.
For example, the models of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Kyle (1989) can be seen as limit
cases of Vives (2011). In this model, in the unique supply function equilibrium (hereafter,
SFE), the interaction of cost correlation with noisy private information (hereafter, interdepen-
dent costs) generates market power that exceeds the full-information benchmark. When costs
are interdependent, the SFE predicts a higher degree of market power than when costs are
uncorrelated. The mechanism that explains these comparative statics results is the following.
With interdependent costs, a Bayesian-rational seller must realize that a high price conveys
the information that the average signal of her rivals is high, and therefore, the seller deduces
that her own costs must also be high. Hence, she should compete less aggressively than if
costs were uncorrelated in order to protect herself from adverse selection. As costs become
more correlated the price is more prominent in the inference of costs, and equilibrium supply
functions become steeper, leading to greater market power. In equilibrium, the combination
of incomplete information and strategic behavior leads to greater market power when costs are
interdependent than when they are uncorrelated. The SFE with uncorrelated costs coincides
with the full-information equilibrium since sellers do not learn about costs from market prices.
Understanding whether high observed market power in natural markets is due to an equi-
librium phenomenon or not is of policy importance. Indeed, a competition authority could
1The following papers argue for the importance of information frictions in markets with competition in
schedules: wholesale electricity markets (Holmberg and Wolak 2016); liquidity auctions (Cassola et al. 2013);
Treasury auctions (Keloharju et al. 2005); carbon dioxide emission permits (Lopomo et al. 2011). Holmberg and
Wolak (2016) argue that cost uncertainty and information asymmetry are large in hydro-dominated markets.
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mistakenly infer collusion from high margins in the wholesale electricity market when in fact
generators were bidding non-cooperatively taking into account the information conveyed by the
price. Or, similarly, the Treasury may suspect collusion in a bond auction when in fact bidders
are responding optimally to the incomplete information environment they face. It is therefore
crucial to test whether the theoretical predictions are borne out in the laboratory, or alterna-
tively, whether we find deviations towards either more competitive or less competitive behavior
than predicted by the equilibrium. Mitigating market power is a primary concern of regulators.2
The between-subjects experimental design is as follows.3 Our two principal treatments
differ in the correlation among costs holding everything else constant. The uncorrelated costs
treatment is relevant in situations where cost shocks among sellers are purely idiosyncratic, while
the positively correlated costs treatment is appropriate when cost shocks among sellers have a
large systematic component due to events that commonly affect all sellers. In two supplementary
treatments we also vary the variance of the noise in private signal in relation to the variance of
costs. In each treatment, participants were randomly assigned to independent groups of twelve
participants, each comprising four markets of three sellers. Sellers competed for several rounds,
and within each group, we applied random matching between rounds in order to retain the
theoretical model’s one-shot nature. The buyer was simulated, and participants were assigned
the role of sellers. Participants received a private signal about the uncertain cost and were
then asked to submit a supply function. As in the theoretical model, and in contrast to most
of the experimental literature, we used a normally distributed information structure that well
approximates the distribution of values in naturally occurring environments. After all decisions
had been made, the uniform market price was calculated and each subject received detailed
feedback about her own performance, the market price, and the behavior and performance of
rivals in the same market.
Although we simplified our design as much as possible, our experiment is somewhat complex.
This is a reflection of the problem we are studying. In conducting our experimental test, we take
received theory about competition in supply functions seriously, in the sense that it is important
to relate the fundamental insights of theoretical market models to observed behavior. In this
paper we study theoretical predictions in a laboratory environment. Naturally it would be of
great interest to relate the theoretical model to field data, but we are not aware of any such
data that would allow us to do this. Simpler designs may make it possible to study participants’
decision processes more in detail. However, we think that the insights gained by studying simple
designs alone are not enough. While simple experiments allow one to study a particular issue
in detail, complex experiments are useful to obtain a more complete picture in environments
where people face more than one problem at the same time. More complex games are certainly
2See, for example, Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) and Holmberg and Wolak (2016).
3In a between-subjects design participants are part of one treatment only.
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required to understand situations of interest like market institutions.4
In our analysis we focus on the comparative statics of cost correlation. Expecting the data
to be consistent with the point predictions may be too demanding in the context of complex
environments like ours. Schotter (2015) discusses in detail the comparative-statics approach
to using experiments for shedding light on theoretical models. Nevertheless, we also compare
our data to point predictions for the SFE. Our findings are as follows. First, in our principal
treatments average market power is not statistically significantly different between treatments
with uncorrelated and interdependent costs. This is our central result. Second, consistent with
the predictions of the SFE, we first find that average market power in markets with uncorrelated
is close to what the SFE prescribes, while market power in the treatment with interdependent
costs is far below the SFE prediction. This suggests that in treatments with interdependent
costs participants are not sufficiently sophisticated with respect to the information structure
and they do not make inferences from the market price.
We then analyze potential explanations of our results. We first ask whether alternative
benchmarks to the SFE describe the data well. Market power in the SFE is the outcome
of two separate factors characterizing fully rational behavior: strategic behavior with respect
to the competitive environment and optimal processing of the information contained in the
cost correlation, the signal structure and the particular signal received. By separately relaxing
these two factors we find two alternative benchmarks to the SFE: price-taking behavior but
informationally sophisticated (hereafter, PT); and behavior that is strategic with respect to
the competitive environment but informationally naïve (hereafter, IN). In addition, we can
also characterize behavior in the absence of both factors that correspond to full rationality
(hereafter, PTIN). Notice that when costs are uncorrelated, the market price does not convey
any information about costs and the SFE coincides with IN, while PT and PTIN are also
identical. In the IN benchmark, participants do not extract information from the market price
and this is equivalent to ignoring the correlation among costs. This corresponds to the fully
cursed equilibrium concept of Eyster and Rabin (2005).
We study behavior in relation to the SFE and the three additional benchmarks, both for
average behavior and, using a mixture model, for individual behavior. For the treatment with
uncorrelated costs, we find that average behavior can reject the PT benchmark, but cannot
reject the SFE benchmark. The results of our mixture model show that a very large percentage
of subjects behave in accordance with the SFE. For the treatment with interdependent costs, our
results show the IN is the only benchmark that cannot be rejected to explain average behavior.
The mixture model results show that together the IN and PT benchmarks can explain most of
the individual behavior. We also investigate whether our main result could be due to a bias
related to Bayesian updating and find that this is not the case.
4See Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2013) for a survey of experimental work on complex multi-unit auctions.
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In the supplementary treatments, we find that if the signal is noisier in relation to the
variance of costs compared to the principal treatments then interdependent costs lead to a sta-
tistically significant increase in average market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated,
but it is small in terms of size. Hence, with respect to our focus on average market power the
results from the supplementary treatments mostly confirm those of the principal treatments.
However, the inference problem of extracting information from the market price is less severe
when signals are less precise since perhaps participants focus less on their private signals and
more on the market price.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. The literature review is in Section 2. In Section
3 we present the theoretical model and the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the experimental
design and procedures. In Section 5 we present the experimental results, and in Section 6 we
provide possible explanations of our results. We conclude in Section 7. Further details of the
analysis are provided in Online Appendices.
2 Literature review
Some but few laboratory experiments have sought to analyze, as we do, competition in supply
functions. Exceptions include the work of Bolle et al. (2013), who focus on testing predictions
of the supply function equilibrium concept, as well as Brandts et al. (2008), and Brandts et al.
(2014), who study how the presence of forward markets and of pivotal suppliers affects prices.
None of these supply function experiments incorporates informational frictions.
Our experiment is also related to the literature of multi-unit uniform price auctions with
incomplete information for which there is evidence of demand reduction—in demand auc-
tions characterized by independent private values and an indivisible good—both experimentally
(Kagel and Levin 2001) and in the field (List and Lucking-Reiley 2000; Engelbrecht-Wiggans
et al. 2005, 2006). Outside the laboratory, Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) empirically evaluate
strategic bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions using data from the Texas electricity mar-
ket. These authors find evidence that large firms bid according to the theoretical benchmark
while smaller firms deviate significantly from that benchmark. Unlike this literature, our paper
addresses a uniform-price auction with interdependent values and a divisible good. The experi-
ment we conduct is also related to that of Sade et al. (2006), who test the theoretical predictions
of a divisible-good, multi-unit auction model under different auction designs; they report some
inconsistencies between the theoretical equilibrium strategies and actual experimental behavior.
More indirectly, our results are related to findings in the literature on the winner’s curse in
single unit auctions where a bidder who is not savvy enough bids too aggressively, be neglecting
that “winning” conveys the news that her signal was the highest in the market. The winner’s
curse is a prevalent, consistent, and robust phenomenon in single-unit auctions featuring com-
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mon (or interdependent) values (Kagel and Levin 1986; Goeree and Offerman 2003; Kagel and
Levin 2015). The analogy between the winner’s curse in single-unit auctions with competition
in supply functions may be relevant with respect to adverse selection but not necessarily with
respect to market power.5
Several other papers study behavior in other contexts and show that individuals fail to
extract information from other people’s actions in various simpler contingent reasoning setups.
Some examples of these contexts include bilateral negotiations (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985),
in the acquiring a company game (Charness and Levin 2009), and voting (Esponda and Vespa
2014). In a simple financial market framework where traders submit limit orders, Ngangoué
and Weizsäcker (2018) find that traders in simultaneous markets have difficulties in deriving
information from hypothetical values of prices, while in sequential markets traders react to the
price in a way that is consistent with a theory. In addition, in strategic games with private
information, such as in Carrillo and Palfrey (2011) as well as Brocas et al. (2014) find that:
(a) a large proportion of participants behave just as in the equilibrium where participants play
simple but strategic private-information games yet (b) this proportion declines markedly with
increasing strategic complexity of the game. In contrast to this literature, our experiment
focuses on a complex environment which is a reflection of the environment that we examine –
supply function competition with information frictions – and the results of simple experiments
do not a priori extrapolate to complex ones.
3 Theoretical background and hypotheses
3.1 Theoretical background
We use the framework of Vives (2011). There are n sellers who compete simultaneously in a
uniform price auction, and each seller submits a supply function. Seller i’s profit is:




where xi are the units sold, θi denotes a random cost parameter, p is the uniform market price,
and λ > 0 represents a parameter that measures the level of transaction costs. The (random)
cost parameter θi is normally distributed as θi ∼ N(µ, σ2θ). The demand is inelastic and equal
5Our results are more closely related to the theoretical notion of the generalized winner’s curse (Ausubel et
al. 2014) which reflects that “winning” a larger quantity is worse news than “winning” a smaller quantity because
the former implies a higher expected cost for the bidder (where bidders are sellers). In our environment a seller
that faces a high price should think that it is likely that costs of her rivals are high and this is news that her
own costs are also high because of the positive correlation. The result is that the seller should moderate her
offer and this induces the supply function to be steeper. Therefore, rational bidders refrain from competing too
aggressively.
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to q, and the market-clearing condition allows us to find the market price p.
The information structure is as follows. A seller does not know the value of the cost shock θi
before submitting her supply schedule, and she receives a signal si = θi + εi for which the error
term is distributed as εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε), and hereafter assume that σ2ε > 0. Sellers’ random cost
parameters may be correlated, with corr(θi, θj) = ρ for i 6= j. Define the variance of the noise in
the private signal over the variance of costs as φ ≡ σ2ε/σ2θ . Hence, the private signal is relatively
precise (imprecise) in relation to the noise in the fundamental if φ is low (high).
Since the payoff function is quadratic and the information structure is normally distributed,
Vives (2011) focuses on symmetric linear-Bayesian equilibrium. Linear supply functions are a
reasonable approximation of the types of supply functions submitted by bidders in real mar-
kets.6 Given the signal received, a strategy for seller i is to submit a price-contingent schedule,
X(si, p) = b− asi+ cp. Thus the seller’s supply function is determined by the three coefficients
(a, b, c). We interpret these coefficients as follows: a is a bidder’s response to the private signal;
b is the fixed part of the supply function’s intercept b−asi; and c is the supply function’s slope.
Vives (2011) finds the unique linear symmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) such that the
first order condition satisfies:
X(si, p) =
p− E[θi | si, p]
d+ λ
, (2)
where (a, b, c) are functions of the information structure (µ, φ, ρ) and market structure (n, q, λ)
and d = 1
(n−1)c is the (endogenous) slope of the inverse residual demand for a seller.
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Let us focus on the equilibrium reasoning. Recall that σ2ε > 0. If ρσ2ε = 0 then costs are
uncorrelated and the seller does not learn about θi from the market price.8 If ρσ2ε > 0 then costs
are interdependent and the market price at the SFE has two roles as can be seen from (2): a)
the market price is an index of scarcity, since a high equilibrium market price means that the
seller has an incentive to increase her supply; b) it contains information about θi, since, if costs
are interdependent, a rational seller should infer that a high price reveals that her cost is high
(because E[θi | si, p] increases with p). Hence, if ρσ2ε > 0, then equilibrium supply functions
are steeper in relation to when costs are uncorrelated. In this case, as either costs become
more correlated (higher ρ) or private signals are less precise (higher φ) then the price is more
prominent in the inference of θi, and equilibrium supply functions become steeper, leading to
greater market power.
The condition that supply equals demand in equilibrium, q =
∑n
i=1X(si, p), yields the
6See, for example, Baldick et al. (2004).
7Throughout the paper, we shall often work with the inverse supply function since it corresponds more
closely to how supply functions were represented in the experiment in the (Quantity,AskPrice) space: p =
b̂+ âsi + ĉX(si, p). Henceforth, we will omit the modifier “inverse” and refer simply to “the supply function”.
8In the auction literature, the case when ρσ2ε = 0 is either referred to as independent values if values are
uncorrelated, or to private values when signals are fully informative.
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expected equilibrium price. The model predicts that equilibrium market outcomes are less
competitive in markets with interdependent costs compared to markets with independent or
private costs. As a consequence, the expected market price and profits of the equilibrium
allocation can be shown to be higher in the former case than in the latter.
We use two classical measures of market power. The first is price impact, d, which can be
defined as the slope of the inverse residual demand for a seller, which reflects the ability of a
seller to influence the market price and measures unilateral market power.9 At the SFE, price
impact is equal to d = λ(1+M)
(n−2−M) , where M =
ρnσ2ε
(1−ρ)((1+(n−1)ρ)σ2θ+σ2ε)
represents an index of adverse
selection. Minimal market power obtains when M = 0 and M increases with ρ and with φ.
When a seller faces a flatter (steeper) inverse residual demand, this means that her capacity to
influence the price is low (high).
The second measure of market power that we use is the (interim) Lerner index, which shows




, and when we average Li for all the sellers of a given market we obtain the





where θ̃ = 1
n
∑





10 The equilibrium market price is p = E(θ̃|s̃)+(d+λ) q
n
, and





. In our predictions for the SFE, we use the average
Lerner index given by (3), while in our empirical analysis we use the average (ex-post) Lerner







Comparing both measures of market power, we notice that price impact captures the extent
to which a seller can influence the market price and mainly depends on sellers’ supply function
slopes. In contrast, the Lerner index, which is often used in empirical work, is a compound
measure which takes into account the market price and the expected marginal cost given the
signals received, and depends on sellers’ supply function slopes and intercepts.
9The residual demand faced by a seller is the market demand not supplied by the other sellers in the same
market. We use the inverse residual demand since we represent it in the (Quantity,AskPrice) space. Price
impact as a measure of market power has been used extensively in the financial economics literature, such as for
example, by Kyle (1989).
10Average (interim) expected marginal cost is equal to: 1n
∑
iEi[MCi] = E(θ̃|s̃) + λx̃, where MCi is the
marginal cost of seller i and x̃ = q/n.
11As it is common in the empirical literature, for the analysis of results we use the average Lerner index with
the realized/actual values of costs. Notice that the average ex-post Lerner index over all the realized values of
the experiment gives us an estimate for the (interim) average Lerner index.
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3.2 Hypotheses
In our analysis of information frictions and market power, we first focus on the comparative
statics of the SFE, and then consider its point predictions.12
Given the theoretical model, the SFE benchmark, we can formulate the following main
hypothesis regarding market power and information frictions.
H1: There is greater market power with interdependent costs than with uncorrelated costs.
Hypothesis 1 is a consequence of the comparative statics of the SFE, which predict that, when
costs are interdependent, the supply function will be steeper than when costs are uncorrelated,
and for a given signal realization, the supply function’s intercept is lower with interdependent
costs than with uncorrelated costs.13 These two factors imply that market power will be greater
with interdependent costs than with uncorrelated costs.
We next formulate a stricter hypothesis relating each treatment to the point predictions
made by the SFE.
H2: Market power in each treatment aligns with the prediction made by the SFE benchmark.
Finally, we formulate a hypothesis regarding the sensitivity of the supply function to the
private signal.
H3: The supply function slope does not depend on the private signal, while the supply
function intercept reacts more to the private signal when it is more precise.
This hypothesis is important in order to check whether the features of this class of models
are observed in our experimental data, namely that the supply function’s intercept depends
on the private signal but that its slope does not, that is that supply functions are of the form
X(si, p) = b− asi + cp.
4 Experimental design and procedures
4.1 Experimental design
The experiment was based on the market environment described in the previous section. Each
subject received a private signal and was subsequently asked to choose two ask prices : one for
the first unit offered (AskPrice1) and one for the second (AskPrice2). We then used these two
ask prices to construct a linear supply schedule, which was shown graphically on each subject’s
12For other studies in experimental industrial organization that focus on the comparative statics of theoretical
models, see Holt (1985) on quantity competition, Brandts et al. (2014) on supply function competition, Morgan
et al. (2006) on price dispersion, Isaac and Reynolds (1988) on the relationship between spillovers and innovation.
13The relationship between cost correlation and market power may be different in other market settings. For
example, in a second-price procurement auction of a single unit bidding, in the case of perfectly correlated costs,
boils down to Bertrand competition, resulting in zero profits and hence zero market power. In contrast, when
costs are independent, market power is strictly positive because the winner obtains the difference between the
second-lowest and lowest cost.
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screen.14 The participant could revise the ask prices several times until she was satisfied with
her decision. The demand was simulated. Once all supply schedules had been submitted,
the auctioneer (the computer) calculated the uniform market price, and participants obtained
feedback on own and rivals’ performance and costs.
Conducting the experiment required us to specify numerical values for the theoretical model’s
fixed parameters. Our choices for the principal treatments are shown in Table 1. The selection of
these values was based on three implementation criteria: (i) the existence of a unique equilibrium;
(ii) sufficiently differentiated equilibrium behavior and outcomes between the treatments with
different correlation levels and equal or similar equilibrium behavior and outcomes with the
same correlation; and (iii) reduction of computational demands placed on participants.
The two principal treatments varied in the correlation among costs (ρ): treatment TUL had
uncorrelated costs (ρ = 0), while treatment TCL had positively correlated costs (ρ = 0.6). We
would have preferred to set a higher correlation among unit costs so that our predictions would
be maximally differentiated. Yet inelastic demand reduces the range for which an equilibrium
exists, and the highest correlation that satisfied our implementation criteria described earlier
was ρ = 0.6. These two principal treatments had a relatively precise private signal with φ = 0.36
in relation to the supplementary treatments, which investigate whether a higher noisiness of the
private signal affects the competitiveness of markets (and these are presented in Section 6.3).
Table 1 describes the parameter values used in the principal treatments of the experiment.
Table 1: Parameter values used in the principal treatments of the experiment.
We chose a market size of 3 because this is the minimum market size that does not lead to col-
lusion in other, similar environments—for example, a Bertrand game (Dufwenberg and Gneezy
14Vives (2011) focuses on symmetric linear-Bayesian supply function equilibria, and we implemented this in
our experiment by restricting participants to submit linear supply functions. In wholesale electricity markets
and Treasury auctions bidders are allowed to bid non-linearly, and for experimental evidence see Bolle et al.
(2013). This may facilitate collusion compared to our case since bidders could try to submit low bids on many
units and very high ones on the units expected to determine the market price. Given the complexity of our
experiment, we decided to stay close to the theoretical model for tractability, but exploring the relation between
non-linear bidding and market power is certainly an issue worth studying in the future.
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2000) and a Cournot market (Huck et al. 2004); Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2013) document
collusion in multi-unit auctions with two bidders but not with five bidders. Each independent
group had 12 participants each, which consisted of 4 markets with 3 sellers in each market.
Participants competed for 25 incentivized rounds in the principal treatments since it is an es-
tablished fact that equilibrium does not appear instantaneously in experimental games. In all of
these rounds, in order to keep the spirit of the theoretical model’s one-shot nature, we employed
random matching between rounds. Thus, the composition of each of the four markets varied
each round within a group.
In addition, we imposed certain market rules, which were inspired by the theoretical model
and facilitated implementation of the experiment. First, we asked each seller to offer all units for
sale. Second, we asked sellers to construct a nondecreasing and linear supply function. Third,
ask prices had to be nonnegative. Fourth, as mentioned above, we imposed a price cap in order
to limit the potential gains of sellers in the experimental sessions. We told bidders that the
simulated buyer would not purchase any unit at a price higher than 3,600 (price cap). The price
cap was not part of the theoretical model, we chose a value high enough to preclude distortion
of equilibrium behavior. Fifth, participants were given an initial endowment with which they
could compensate losses during the duration of the session with the objective to speed up the
learning process. If a subject had negative total profits in a given round, we allowed this subject
to continue with the experiment since she could recover from losses in subsequent rounds before
the end of the game.
At the end of each round, each participant received feedback on the uniform market price,
her own performance (with regard to revenues, production costs, transaction costs, units sold,
and profits), the performance of the other two market participants (units sold, profits, and
supply functions), and the values of the random variables drawn (her own cost and the costs
of the other two participants in the same market).15 Participants were allowed to consult
the history of their own performance. Other experiments have shown that feedback affects
behavior in the laboratory. In a Cournot game, for example, Offerman et al. (2002) report
that different feedback rules can result in outcomes that range from competitive to collusive.
Given the complexity of our experiment, we maximized the feedback given after each round in
order to maximize the potential learning of participants. After each participant had checked
her feedback, a new round of the game would start. Note that, in each market and for each
round, we generated three random unit costs from a multivariate normal distribution. Also, in
each round and for each participant, the unit costs and signals were independent draws from
previous and future rounds.
Given the experimental parameters, Table 2 shows the SFE predictions for various indicators
15Subjects did not receive feedback on the signal received by others because that would not be expected to
occur in reality.
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of behavior and market power.16
Table 2: SFE predictions in the principal treatments.
4.2 Experimental procedures
We ran the experiment with 384 participants, 144 of which participated in the principal treat-
ments grouped in 72 participants for each of the treatments described in Table 1, and 240
participants who participated in the supplementary sessions. Each principal treatment had 6
independent groups of 12 members each. Participants competed for 2 trial rounds before the
incentivized rounds to familiarize themselves with the context. At the end of the experiment,
participants completed a questionnaire that requested personal information and asked questions
about the subject’s reflections after playing the game. Once the questionnaire was completed,
each participant was paid in private.
Sessions were conducted in the LINEEX laboratory of the University of Valencia. The par-
ticipants were undergraduate students in the fields of economics, finance, business, mathematics,
engineering, and natural sciences.17 All sessions were computerized.18 Instructions were read
aloud, questions were answered in private, and—throughout the sessions—no communication
was allowed between participants. Instructions explained all details of the market rules, dis-
tributional assumptions on the random costs, the nature of signals, and the correlation among
costs (the meaning of correlation was explained both with a definition and graphically). We
tested participants’ understanding with a pre-experimental comprehension test.
During the experiment participants won or lost points. At the end of the experiment, the to-
tal number of points were exchanged for euros at the rate of 10,000 experimental points per Euro.
Each participant started with 50,000 experimental points.19The payments ultimately made to
16Online Appendix B explains how we calculated the variables in Table 2.
17As in most laboratory experiments, our subjects are university students. A natural question is how useful
our data are to shed light on what happens in markets in which decisions are typically made by experience
market traders. Fréchette (2015) surveys all the existing experimental studies in which the behavior of students
and experts are compared. His overall conclusion is that: “(. . . ), overall much of the big picture seems the same
whether one looks at professionals or students in laboratory experiments testing economic models.”
18For this purpose we used the z-tree software (Fischbacher 1999).
19An alternative to our payment scheme would have been to use the random-lottery incentive scheme and pay
participants only the earnings of one period selected at random. This procedure has the potential of eliminating
wealth effects that can arise when paying for all periods. At the same time, given that we have 25 periods, the
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participants in the principal treatments ranged from 10 to 30.4 euros and averaged 22 eu-
ros.20 Each session lasted an average of 2.5 hours. See Online Appendix A for the instructions,
comprehension test, screenshots used for running the experiment, and the end-of-experiment
questionnaire, and Online Appendix D for details of participants’ demographic information.
5 Experimental results
In Section 5.1 we provide an analysis of the comparative statics between information frictions
and market power, while in Section 5.2 we empirically evaluate the SFE prediction in each
treatment and conduct a best-response analysis. Section 5.3 analyses the sensitivity of the
supply function to the private signal. For comparability with the supplementary treatments,
we use the first 18 rounds in all treatments. Further analysis on all the 25 rounds time trends
and can be found in the Online Appendices C.1 and C.2.
5.1 Comparative statics of information frictions and market power
We use price impact and the Lerner index as our main measures for market power, and to get
a more complete view, we also analyze the participant’s supply functions, characterized by the
intercept and the slope, market prices and profits in each of the treatments.21
Table 3 provides summary statistics of market power, which include the mean, standard
deviation and median. Figure 1 shows the average supply function in each treatment, when de-
cisions are averaged across all rounds, together with the corresponding theoretical benchmarks.
We observe from Figure 1 that average supply functions in TUL and TCL are very close, and
Table 3 shows that supply functions are even closer when looking at the median. In addition, we
find that the average experimental supply function in the uncorrelated costs treatment (TUL) is
close to the corresponding SFE benchmark, while in the interdependent costs treatment (TCL),
observed behavior appears to be far from the SFE. These results bear some resemblance to the
result presented in Goeree and Offerman (2003) in the context of a single-unit and a second-
price auction comparing common versus uncorrelated private values, and to the winner’s curse
probability of a particular period being chosen may be too small to have participants engage and focus their
attention. In any case, note that we concentrate on a treatment comparison, which should not be affected by the
specific features of the payment scheme. For an interesting discussion of different payment schemes see Bardsley
et al. (2009).
20Given the length of the experimental sessions, we gave participants some additional euros ex-post to ensure
that minimum earnings were 10 euros. In the principal treatments, there were only 3 subjects in TUL and 4
subjects in TCL that had a cumulated profit below zero for at least one round.
21We analyze bidding behavior in terms of the inverse supply function since it corresponds to how participants
made their decisions: p = InterceptPQ+SlopePQX(si, p), where InterceptPQ and SlopePQ are the intercept
and slope of the inverse supply function, respectively. For profits and the Lerner index, we used the ex-post
measures with the realized values of costs. See Online Appendix B for more details.
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observed in common value auctions where bidders ignore the perfect correlation among costs
(Kagel and Levin 1986).
Table 3: Summary statistics of indicators of market power in each treatment.
Note. The second row after each variable in brackets and italics is the standard deviation (s.d.). The unit
of analysis for price impact, supply function and profit is the individual choice in each round (there are 1,296
observations in each treatment except for price impact since it is not defined for 45 observations in the TUL and
31 in the TCL because of a null denominator). For the Lerner index and market price, the unit of analysis is
the market with 432 in each treatment (in the TUL the Lerner index is not defined for 1 observation that as a
market price equal to zero).
Figure 1: Average experimental supply functions and theoretical benchmarks in each of the
treatments.
Note. SFE refers to the supply function equilibrium benchmark, and EXP to the average experimental supply
function.
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Observe in Table 3 that all the indicators of market power are very similar between the two
treatments. Note that the average Lerner index in TUL is negative since it is influenced by a few
large outliers which mainly occurred during the first four rounds: these had a very low market
price due to some subjects placing very low ask prices. When testing the hypothesis that there
is no difference in the indicators of market power at the aggregate level, we find no difference
in any of the indicators of market power between treatments TUL and TCL. Using a Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum test (the unit of observation is the average per group, and there
are 6 observations per treatment), the test results are: price impact (p-value=0.423); Lerner
index (p-value=0.873); supply function slope (p-value=0.423) and intercept (p-value=0.749).
In addition, we do not find differences in terms of market prices (p-value=1.000) and profits
(p-value=0.423) between treatments.
We can summarize our findings with respect to H1 as follows:
Result 1 [Comparative statics related to market power and information frictions]:
Average market power is not statistically significantly different between TCL and
TUL. This result is not consistent with our H1.
5.2 Empirical evaluation of the SFE point prediction
Our next analysis examines the specific point predictions made by the SFE with respect to
market power in each treatment. Note that this is a very stringent test of the benchmark, and
is not the primary focus of our investigation. We conduct this in two septs. As a first step,
we use individual level data and run two random-effects panel regressions of the indicators of
market power on the treatment dummy and controls (private signal and round) reported in
Online Appendix C.3. As a second step, we use these regression results to carry out post-
estimation t-tests of the equality of the regression’s coefficients (the constant and treatment
dummy) to the to the specific point prediction made by the SFE. The results obtained and
presented in Table 4 allow us to statistically test whether the two indicators of market power
accord to the SFE benchmark.
Table 4: Statistical tests of the SFE point predictions regarding market power: p-values of testing
price impact and Lerner index.
Note. The p-values presented in the table are the result of testing with t-tests the following hypotheses that follow
from the regressions presented in Online Appendix C.3: in TUL that “constant=SFE prediction in TUL” while
in TCL that “constant+treatment_dummy=SFE prediction in TCL”. The tests are based on 2,516 observations
for price impact and 863 for the Lerner index.
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The results show that we cannot reject that the two indicators of market power are equal to
the ones prescribed by the SFE in TUL, but we reject them in TCL. The next result sums up
the evidence relating to H2.22
Result 2 [Tests of the point predictions of the SFE in each of the treatments]:
We cannot reject that average market power is consistent with the SFE predictions
in TUL, but it is statistically significantly different from the SFE point predictions
in TCL.
Therefore, we reject H2 in TCL but not in TUL.
We then conduct a best response analysis to see how actual profits compare to the ex-post
optimal profits for subjects in each treatment. We compute ex-post optimal profits for a subject
at a given round by calculating the optimal supply function that gives the highest possible profit
given the choices of the rivals in this given round. We find the extent to which individual supply
functions are a best response to the rivals’ supply functions using detailed data of each round.
We compute the differences between ex-post optimal profits and actual profits, and we refer to
these differences as losses. The following table reports the results.
Table 5: Summary statistics of losses (differences between ex-post optimal profits and actual
profits) of all participants.
We find that median losses in TCL are 1.5 times larger than in TUL. This means that there
is more sub-optimal behavior in TCL than in TUL, which might explain why we do not see a
convergence towards the SFE prediction in this treatment.
5.3 Sensitivity of the supply function to the private signal
In order to further investigate how this result may be related to how individuals respond to the
private signal, we next study how responsive the supply functions are to the private signal in
each treatment. This analysis is important since the private signal is the input that subjects
receive in each round, and in addition, it allows us to test whether the general features of the
SFE model are observed in our experimental data. In particular, we want to test whether
22A test based on a first step regression without controls and simply with the constant and treatment dummy
as explanatory variables rejects H2 for TUL. We believe that the regression including controls leads to a more
appropriate test.
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experimental supply functions have the structure proposed by the theory, that is, that the
supply function intercept is sensitive to the private signal while its slope is not.
We run random effects panel regressions with the dependent variables supply function slope
(SlopePQ) and intercept (InterceptPQ) on the private signal independent variable (Signal) and
a treatment dummy (D_TCL, which is 1 in TCL and 0 in TUL). These regressions cluster
standard errors at the independent group level and are reported in Online Appendix C.3. As
predicted by the theoretical model, we find that the private signal is not significant in the
regressions of the supply function slope in neither of the treatments: coefficient on the signal
(p-value=0.411) and on the treatment dummy (p-value=0.178).
However, the private signal does have a significant effect on the supply function intercept
in each treatments: coefficient on the signal (p-value=0.000) and on the treatment dummy (p-
value=0.346). There is no significant difference in how subjects respond to the private signal in
either of the treatments. The next result summarizes our findings with respect to H3.
Result 3 [The responsiveness of supply functions to the private signal]:
The supply function slope is not influenced by the private signal, while the supply
function intercept is responsive to the private signal in both treatments.
This result is consistent with H3.
The result suggests that the general features of the model are observed in the data. However,
we do not find a difference in how supply function intercepts depend on the private signal in
TUL and TCL. In TUL deviations from the SFE prediction are not large but in TCL these are
substantial.
6 Possible explanations of our results
We consider three possible ex-post explanations of our results: alternative benchmarks (Section
6.1); Bayesian updating (Section 6.2); supplementary treatments which check whether our result
may be related to the precision of the private signal (Section 6.3); and summary (Section 6.4).
6.1 Alternative benchmarks
Since the SFE point prediction does not explain the data well in TCL, we posit three alternative
benchmarks and take them to the data. Note that for the SFE predictions, we have assumed that
all sellers are perfectly rational, that they have common knowledge of the rationality of other
players, and that they coordinate expectations on the SFE. We formulate our three alternative
16
benchmarks by relaxing the two key factors of SFE (strategic behavior with respect to the
competitive environment and optimal information processing) that lead to market power.23
A first possibility is that bidders are informationally naïve (hereafter, IN) since they do not
extract information from the market price. This is equivalent to sellers ignoring the correlation
among costs. This implies that cIN = n−2
λ(n−1) (since it is as if M = 0), the corresponding price
impact is dIN = λ
(n−2) . This benchmark is equivalent to the fully cursed equilibrium of Eyster
and Rabin (2005) in our context.
A second possibility is that subjects are price takers (hereafter, PT) since they do not
perceive the influence of their supply function decisions on prices, but condition on their private
signal and learn from the price. This benchmark is equivalent to marginal cost pricing with
sellers having the correct expectations about costs. The equilibrium supply function at the
price-taking equilibrium (PT) has cPT = 1
λ(M+1)
, which implies that dPT = λ(1+M)
n−1 .
A third possibility is that sellers are both price takers and informationally naïve (hereafter,
PTIN). This is the case when agents ignore both strategic and inference effects. This is equiv-
alent to marginal cost pricing with sellers having naïve expectations about costs (i.e. ignoring
the correlation among costs). The equilibrium supply function slope for price-taking and in-
formationally naïve participants (PTIN) has cPTIN = 1
λ
, which implies that dPTIN = λ
n−1 . This
benchmark combines the previously presented alternatives: IN and PT.
Note that apart from being conceptually well-defined there is some evidence consistent with
both types of deviations from rationality behind our alternative benchmarks. For further em-
pirical evidence on informationally naïve participants in other contexts refer to the Literature
Review section. It is a priori reasonable that such informationally naiveness is also present in
our setting. With respect to price-taking behavior, there are a number on experimental settings
in which sellers do no fully exploit their market power. Holt (1995) finds that in quantity-setting
experiments sellers set quantities above equilibrium levels. In an environment closer to ours,
Abbink and Brandts (2005) find that in price competition with homogeneous goods, where
sellers know own cost but not others’ costs, pricing is more aggressive than in equilibrium.
Table 6 presents the price impact predictions of these alternative benchmarks together with
the prescription of the SFE. Notice that if costs are uncorrelated then the price is not infor-
mative about costs and, hence, the PT and PTIN benchmarks are identical, and IN coincides
with the SFE benchmark. In addition, we can see that market power is greater when sellers
are strategic (i.e. in the SFE benchmark) than when they are price takers (i.e. in the PT
benchmark). When costs are interdependent, sellers have the greatest market power when they
are strategic and exploit the informational content of the price (SFE benchmark), followed by
when sellers are strategic but informationally naïve (IN), followed by (under our parametriza-
tion) when sellers are price takers even if they exploit the informational content of the price
23For brevity, for the more detailed analysis in this section we focus on price impact.
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(PT), and the smallest market power occurs in markets with fully naïve sellers (PTIN). Notice
that the differences between PT, IN, PTIN are small. We find that in treatments with interde-
pendent costs (TCL and TCH), the SFE predicts a substantially larger market power than all
the alternative benchmarks, while in treatments with uncorrelated costs (TUL and TUH), the
predictions of the SFE and alternative benchmarks are more similar.24
Table 6: Price impact predictions for alternative benchmarks and the SFE in each treatment.
Table 7 presents the results of testing each of these benchmarks in the two treatments
following the same approach as in Section 5.2 (the intermediate steps for this test are in Online
Appendix C.3).
Table 7: Statistical tests of the price impact point predictions: p-values of testing the SFE and
alternative theoretical benchmarks.
Note. The p-values presented in the table are the result of testing with t-tests the following hypotheses that
follow from the regressions presented in Online Appendix C.3: in TUL that “constant=benchmark prediction in
TUL” while in TCL that “constant+treatment_dummy=benchmark prediction in TCL”. The tests are based on
2,516 observations.
Using price impact, the results show that in the TUL we cannot reject the SFE prediction (p-
value=0.926), but we can reject that on average subjects behave according to the PT prediction.
However, in TCL we reject the SFE, PT and PTIN predictions as benchmarks for describing
average behavior, but we cannot reject that the IN benchmark describes the data well (p-
value=0.218). This would suggest that the SFE fails in the TCL not because individuals are
naïve with respect the (complex) competitive environment but because they are not sufficiently
24Note that these three alternative benchmarks make similar predictions in the two treatments and so it might
be empirically difficult to distinguish between them in these two treatments. We selected them on an a priori
basis and not to fit the data.
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sophisticated with respect to the information structure since they cannot make inferences from
the market price. This results in outcomes that are much more competitive than predicted.
The previous result concerns average behavior. However, another interesting element to an-
alyze is the dispersion in market power in each treatment, which is a result of the heterogeneous
behavior of subjects in our experiment. For brevity, we use price impact in the rest of this
sub-section. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the dispersion of price impact in each treatment.
Figure 2 shows that market power in the uncorrelated costs treatment is more homogeneous
than in the interdependent costs treatment. We test this formally using Levene’s test of homo-
geneity of variances where the unit of analysis is the same as in Figure 2, and obtain that we
reject that variances are the same in TUL and TCL (p-value=0.000).
Figure 2: Histograms for price impact for each subject in each treatment and the benchmarks.
Note. The unit of analysis is price impact averaged over the 18 rounds for each subject (72 observations in each
treatment).
To go one step further in our analysis of heterogeneity, in Online Appendix C.4 we report
the results of estimating a mixture model estimation of the proportion of participants that have
a price impact of each type. In the TUL, we find that 91% of the participants can be classified
to be SFE types, while 9% can be classified as PT types. In the TCL, we find that 1% are
PTIN, 48% are PT, 46% are IN, and 5% are SFE. Notice that in this treatment, we find that a
large percentage of subjects do not engage in optimal behavior -either because they fail to take
into account the correlation among costs or because they behave as if they were price-taking.
6.2 Bayesian updating
One could argue that participants fail to engage in Bayesian updating and that this is why,
in treatment TCL, they fail to understand that the market price is informative about costs.
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To explore this possibility further and to assist participants in the decision-making process, we
conducted an supplementary treatment with 24 participants with two independent groups in
the modified TCL treatment, hereafter TCL-Bayesian. The experimental design features were
as in the baseline treatment but with three exceptions as follows. First, in addition to the
signal received, each subject received the expected value of her own costs—and of her rivals’
costs—conditional on the signal received (thus subject i received a signal si and was also given
E[θi | si] and E[θj | si] for i 6= j).25 Second, we explicitly asked each subject to think about
what her rivals would do and provided a simulation tool that participants could use to make a
provisional decision, based on those beliefs, and then visualize the resulting market price; the
participant could then revise her decision. Third, the experiment lasted for 15 rounds due to
time constraints.
Table 8 presents the summary statistics of behavior and outcomes in the TCL-Bayesian
treatment. We find that the average supply function and outcomes in the robustness session are
similar to the averages of the baseline treatments, presented in Table 3, that correspond to the
TCL treatment. Our results in the TCL-Bayesian treatment suggest that the results in TCL
are not simply due to a bias related to Bayesian updating.
Table 8: Market power and information frictions in the TCL-Bayesian treatment.
Note. The second row after each variable in brackets and italics is the standard deviation (s.d.). The unit
of analysis for price impact, supply function and profit is the individual choice in each round (there are 360
observations except for price impact since it is not defined for 8 observations because of a null denominator).
For the Lerner index and market price, the unit of analysis is the market with 120 observations.
25The participant instructions for this supplementary treatment are available upon request. We explained
conditional expectations by telling participants that, in each round, an expert would give them the expected
value of both their and their rivals’ unit cost.
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6.3 Noisiness of the private signal
We developed ex-post supplementary treatments to investigate whether an increase in the vari-
ance of the noise of the private signal over the variance of costs (φ) affects the competitiveness of
markets. Vives (2011) also gives us predictions on how the combinations the correlation among
costs, ρ, and φ affect equilibrium market power.
In these two treatments, we increased φ: φ = 36 with σ2θ = 100 and σ2ε = 3, 600. We ran
an uncorrelated costs treatment with ρ = 0 (TUH), and an interdependence costs treatment
with ρ = 0.175 (TCH). For TCH, the combinations (ρ, φ) were chosen so that this treatment
had similar level of market power to TCL, to make both treatments easily comparable. In
addition, for φ = 36 the equilibrium does not exist for any ρ > 0.25, and hence we chose
ρ = 0.175 which, within the range of existence, has a very similar level of market power as
TCL.26 The SFE predictions for these two supplementary treatments are presented in Table 9.
Notice that treatments TUH and TCH have a very similar predicted market power as TUL and
TCL, respectively.
Table 9: SFE predictions for treatments TUH and TCH
Hypotheses 1 about the comparative statics of market power also applies to this setting.
In particular, the SFE predicts that there is greater market power with interdependent costs
(TCH) than with uncorrelated costs (TUH), and the market power is the same in treatments
with uncorrelated costs (TUH and TUL) regardless of the noisiness of the private signal.
Table 10 presents the results of measuring market power in TUH and TCH, which can be
compared to the main results presented in Table 3. The information contained in the table shows
that average market power is generally greater in TCH than TUH, as predicted by the SFE
comparative statics. We statistically evaluate it using a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(the unit of observation is the average per group, and there are 6 observations per treatment),
and we confirm it for: price impact (p-value=0.0065), Lerner index (p-value=0.0163), supply
function slope (p-value=0.0039), supply function intercept (p-value=0.0039), market prices (p-
value=0.016), and profits (p-value=0.055). However, the magnitude of the effect is small since
average market power in TCH is substantially lower than predicted by the SFE.
26For robustness, Online Appendix E presents the analysis of an additional treatment (TCHH) with interde-
pendent costs and a higher φ = 3600.
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We also statistically evaluate whether average market power is the same in treatments with
uncorrelated costs (TUH and TUL) using the same procedure as above. We obtain that we
cannot reject the prediction for price impact (p-value=0.337), Lerner index (p-value=0.2002),
supply function slope (p-value=0.423), and supply function intercept (p-value=0.262). However,
the evidence for profits is weaker (p-value=0.055), and we reject that market prices are the same
in the two treatments with uncorrelated costs (p-value=0.016). Notice that we can also conclude
that experimental behavior in TUH is close to the SFE benchmark.
Table 10: SFE predictions in treatments TUH and TCH
Note. The second row after each variable in brackets and italics is the standard deviation (s.d.). The unit
of analysis for price impact, supply function and profit is the individual choice in each round (there are 1,296
observations in each treatment, except for price impact since it is not defined for 11 observations in the TUH
and 8 in the TCH because of a null denominator.) For the Lerner index and market price, the unit of analysis
is the market with 432 in each treatment.
We can summarize our findings in the following result as follows:
Result 4 [Market power and the precision of the private signal]:
(i) If signals are imprecise then market power is statistically significantly higher
with interdependent costs (TCH) compared to when costs are uncorrelated (TUH).
However, the magnitude of the difference is small.
(ii) As predicted, there is no significant difference in average market power between
markets with uncorrelated costs (TUL and TUH) regardless of the noisiness of the
private signal.
To sum up, we find that market power is statistically significantly larger with interdependent
costs and more imprecise private signals in relation to when costs are uncorrelated and private
signals are more accurate. However, the magnitude of the difference is small compared to the
magnitude of the predicted difference. When subjects are given more imprecise private signals
then the inference problem of extracting information from the market price seems to becomes
less severe, but not enough so as to lead to a substantial increase in market power.
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6.4 Overall summary of possible explanations of our results
In this section we have investigated three possible explanations of our results. Our findings
suggest that, in interdependent cost treatments the divergence between average behavior and the
SFE predictions is related to participants’ lack of sophistication with respect to the information
environment. A further exploration of heterogeneity shows that a large percentage of subjects in
TUL behave as prescribed by the SFE, while in the TCL there is a large divergence from what
is predicted, either because subjects ignore the correlation among costs or because they behave
as price takers. We find that this is not due to a bias related to simple Bayesian updating but it
is related to the fact that, on average, subjects neglect the information conveyed by the market
price and this translates into lower observed market power. In the supplementary treatments
subjects are given more imprecise signals. We find that, on average, in these treatments market
power is statistically significantly higher with interdependent costs compared to uncorrelated
costs perhaps because they focus less on their private signal and more on the market price.27
7 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed bidding behavior in a theory-based experimental setting that reflects some
of the complexity of real-world markets where bidders compete in supply functions, have in-
complete information about their costs, and receive a noisy private signal. We focus on the
comparative statics of the supply function equilibrium (SFE) to study our experimental results.
We also consider alternative benchmarks resulting from relaxing the assumptions of the SFE.
We used two principal and two supplementary treatments that vary in the correlation among
costs and the precision of the private signals in relation to the precision of costs. In the principal
treatments private signals are more precise than in our supplementary treatments.
Our experimental results document certain causal relations between information frictions
and market power in the context of supply function competition. Contrary to our hypothesis,
in our principal treatments average market power in markets with interdependent costs is the
same as with uncorrelated costs. In the supplementary treatments with relatively noisier private
signals than in the principal treatments, we find that interdependent costs lead to a statistically
significant but small increase in market power, much smaller than predicted by the SFE.
We can connect our results to policy considerations pertaining to natural markets like the
wholesale electricity market or Treasury bond auctions. We observe low market power in our
four treatments. Since in our setting explicit collusion is excluded by design our results with
interdependent costs and precise private signals would suggest that the observation of high
27These results might be related to the fact that when there are two sources of information (the private signal
and the price), the relatively quality of these two sources of information may matter for the agents’ attentiveness
when they have a limited capacity to process information (Kacperczyk et al. 2016).
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prices in natural markets would point to the existence of some kind of collusion.28 Overall,
competition authorities may want to fine-tune their collusion screening procedures by taking
into account the information structure of the market, in particular cost correlation, in settings
with supply function competition. We find some evidence that an increase in the precision of
private signals leads to a decrease in market power. This results suggests that any increase in
transparency that translates into lowering the noise in the private signals would lead to a small
pro-competitive effect.29
Our experiment suggests additional questions for future research, both experimental and
theoretical. An important extension of our work would be to allow bidders in the experiment
to submit non-linear supply functions. Additional future work could explore mechanisms by
which participants learn how to improve information extraction from the price (e.g., asking
participants to come back to the laboratory a few days later -experienced bidders; replicating
the experiment with professional traders). Increased capacity to learn from the price would
imply a potential higher exercise of market power. The experimental findings reported here
also call for the development of theoretical models that analyze market competition among
participants who exhibit various degrees of sophistication in markets characterized by supply
function competition and private information.
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Appendix A. Instructions, comprehension test, experimental
screenshots and post-experiment questionnaire
A.1. Instructions
These instructions are for the treatment with positively correlated costs and have been translated
from Spanish. The instructions for the other three treatments are analogous.
INSTRUCTIONS
You are about to participate in an economic experiment. Your profits depend on your decisions
and on the decisions of other participants. Read the instructions carefully. You can click on the
links at the bottom of each page to move forward or backward. Before starting the experiment,
we will give a summary of the instructions and there will be two trial rounds.
THE EXPERIMENT
You will earn 5 Euros for participating in the experiment regardless of your performance in the
game. You will gain (lose) points during the experiment. At the end of the experiment, points
are exchanged for euros. 10,000 points are equivalent to 1 Euro. Each player will start with an
initial capital of 50,000 points. Gains (losses) that you accumulate during the experiment will
be added (subtracted) to the initial capital. Players who have accumulated losses at the end of
∗Universitat Ramon Llull, ESADE Business School.
†Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE.
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the experiment will receive 5 Euros for participating. Players with gains will receive their gains
converted to Euros plus the 5 Euro participation fee.
The experiment will last 25 rounds. In the experiment you will participate in a market. You
will be a seller of a fictitious good. Each market will have 3 sellers. Market participants will
change randomly from round to round. At any given time, no one knows who she is matched
with. We guarantee anonymity. The buying decisions will be made by the computer and not
a participant of the experiment. In each round and market, the computer will buy exactly 100
units of the good.
YOUR PROFITS
In each round, your profits are calculated as shown in the figure below:
Your profits are equal to the income you receive from selling units minus total costs (con-
sisting of production and transaction costs).
Some details to keep in mind: you only pay the total costs of the units that you sell. If you
sell zero units in a round, your profits will also be zero in this round. You can make losses when
your income is less than the total costs (production and transaction). The cumulative profits
are the sum of the profits (losses) on each round. Losses will be deducted from the accumulated
profits. Throughout the experiment, a window in the upper left corner of your screen will show
the current round and accumulated profits.
YOUR DECISION
In each round, you have to decide the minimum price that you are willing to sell each unit for.
We call these Ask Prices.
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THE MARKET PRICE
Once the three sellers in a given market have entered and confirmed their decisions, the computer
calculates the market price as follows.
1. In each market, the computer observes the 300 Ask Prices introduced by the sellers of
your market.
2. The computer ranks the 300 Ask Prices from the lowest to the highest.
3. The computer starts buying the cheapest unit, then it buys the next unit, etc. until it
has purchased exactly 100 units. At this time the computer stops.
4. The Ask Price of the 100th unit purchased by the computer is the market price (the price
of the last unit purchased by the computer).
The market price is the same for all units sold in a market. In other words, a seller receives
a payment, which is equal to the market price for each unit she sells. If more than one unit is
offered at the market price, the computer calculates the difference:
Units Remaining= 100- Units that are offered at prices below the market price.
The Units Remaining are then split proportionally among the sellers that have offered them
at an Ask Price equal to the market price.
UNITS SOLD
In each round and market, the three sellers offer a total of 300 units. The computer purchases
the 100 cheapest units. Each seller sells those units that are offered at lower Ask Prices than
the market price. Note that those units that are offered at higher Ask Prices than the market
price are not sold. Those units offered at an Ask Price which is equal to the market price will
be divided proportionally among the sellers that have offered them.
MARKET RULES
In each round and market, the computer buys exactly 100 units of the good at a price not
exceeding 3.600. In order to simplify the task of entering all Ask Prices in each round, we
request that you to enter:
• Ask Price for Unit 1
• Ask Price for Unit 2
Ask Prices can be different for different units. To find Ask Prices for the other units, we will
join the Ask Price for Unit 1 and the Ask Price for Unit 2 by a straight line. In this way, we find
the Ask Prices for all the 100 units. In the experiment, you will be able to see this graphically
and try different values until you are satisfied with your decision.
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We apply the following five market rules.
1. You must offer all the 100 units for sale.
2. Your Ask Price for one unit must always be greater than or equal to the Ask Price of the
previous unit. Therefore, the Ask Price for the second unit cannot be less than the Ask Price
for the first unit. You can only enter integers for your decisions.
3. Both Ask Prices must be zero or positive.
4. The buyer will not purchase any unit at a price above the price cap of 3,600.
5. The Ask Price for some units may be lower your unit cost, since unit costs are unknown
at the time when you decide the Ask Prices. You may have losses.
EXAMPLE
This example is illustrative and irrelevant to the experiment itself. We give the example on
paper. Here you can see how the computer determines the market price and units sold by each
seller in a market.
UNIT COST
In each round the unit cost is random and unknown to you at the time of the decision. The unit
cost is independent of previous and future round. Your unit cost is different from the unit cost
of other participants. However, your unit cost is related to the unit costs of the other market
participants. Below we explain how unit costs are related and we give a figure and explanation
of the possible values of unit costs and their associated frequencies. This figure is the same for
all sellers and all round.
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The horizontal displays the unit cost while the vertical axis shows the frequency with which
each unit cost occurs (probability). This frequency is indicated by the length of the correspond-
ing bar.
In the figure you can see that the most frequent unit cost is 1,000. We obtain 1,000 as unit
cost with a frequency of 0.35%. In general terms, we would obtain a unit cost of 1,000 in 35 of
1,000 cases.
In 50% of the cases (50 of 100 cases), the unit cost will be between 933 and 1,067.
In 75% of the cases (75 of 100 cases), the unit cost will be between 885 and 1,115 .
In 95% of the cases (95 of 100 cases), the unit cost will be between 804 and 1,196 .
There is a very small chance that the unit cost is less than 700. This can occur in 1 of 1,000
cases approximately. Similarly, there is a very small chance that the unit cost is greater than
1,300. This occurs can occur in 1 of 1,000 cases, approximately.
For participants with knowledge of statistics: the unit cost is normally distributed with
mean 1,000 and standard deviation 100.
INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR UNIT COST (YOUR SIGNAL)
In each round, each participant receives information on her unit costs. This information is not
fully precise. The signal that you receive is equal to:
Signal = UnitCost+ Error
The error is independent of your unit cost, it is also independent from the unit costs of other
participants and it is independent from past and future errors. The following figure describes
the possible values of the error term and an indication of how likely each error is likely to occur.
This graph is the same for all sellers and rounds.
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On the horizontal axis you can observe the possible values of the error terms. On the vertical
axis, you can observe the frequency with which each error occurs (probability). This frequency
is indicated by the length of the corresponding bar.
In the figure you can see that the most common error is 0. The frequency of error 0 is 0.66
%. In general terms, this means that in approximately 66 of 10.000 cases you would get an error
equal to 0.
In 50% of the cases (50 of 100 cases), the error term is between -40 and 40.
In 75% of the cases (75 of 100 cases), the error is between -69 and 69.
In 95% of the cases (95 of 100 cases), the error is between -118 and 118.
There is a very small chance that the error is less than -200. This occurs in 4 out of 10,000
cases. Similarly, there is a very small probability that the error is greater than 200. This occurs
in 4 out of 10,000 cases.
For participants with knowledge of statistics: the error has a normal distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation 60.
HOW YOUR COST IS RELATED TO THE COSTS OF THE OTHER SELLERS
The unit cost is different for each seller and your unit cost is related to the unit cost of the
other sellers in your market. The association between your unit cost and unit cost of another
seller in your market follows the trend:
• The higher your unit cost, the higher will be the unit cost of the other sellers.
• The lower your unit cost, the lower the unit cost of the other sellers.
6
The strength of the association between your unit cost and unit cost of another seller is measured
on a 0 to 1 scale. The strength of the association between your unit cost and unit cost of the
other seller is +0.6 .
Graphically we can see the relationship between your unit cost (horizontal axis) and the
unit cost of another seller (vertical axis) for some strengths of association. The figure that has
a red frame corresponds to an intensity of association of +0.6.
For participants with knowledge of statistics: the correlation between your unit cost and
unit cost of any other player is +0.6 .
END OF ROUND FEEDBACK
At the end of each round, we will give you information about:
• Your profits (losses) and its components (Revenue-Cost of Production - Cost of transac-
tion)
• Market price
• Your units sold
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• Other market participants feedback: decisions; profits and unit costs.
You can also check your historical performance in a window in the upper right corner of your
screen. During the experiment the computer performs mathematical operations to calculate the
market price, units sold, Ask Prices for intermediate units, etc. For these calculation we use all
available decimals. However, we show all the variables rounded to whole numbers, except from
the market price.
THE END
This brings us to the end of the instructions. You can take your time to re-read the instructions
by pressing the BACK button. When you understand the instructions you can indicate it to us
by pressing the OK button at the bottom of the screen. Next you have to answer a questionnaire
about the instructions, unit cost distributions and signals. When all participants have taken
the questionnaire and indicated OK, we will start the practice rounds. Your profits or losses of
the practice rounds will not be added or subtracted to your earnings during the experiment.
A.2. Comprehension test
Questions. Answer True or False.
1. The unit cost has the same value for each of the participants in your market.
2. The unit cost is not the same in each round.
3. If my unit cost is high, it is rather likely that the unit cost of another seller is high.
4. Unit costs between 1000 and 1200 occur with the same frequency than unit costs between
1000 and 700.
5. Unit costs larger than 1000 occur with the same frequency as unit costs smaller than 1000.
6. Errors larger than 0 occur more frequently than errors smaller than 0.
7. An error of 5 is the most frequent error.
8. The seller who sells most units will always have the highest profit.
9. If my unit cost is low, it is rather likely that the unit cost of another seller is high.
10. The market price is the same for all units and sellers.
Answers (True (T) and False (F)): Q1. F Q2. T Q3. T (treatment 0.6); F (treatment 0)
Q4. F Q5. T Q6. F Q7. F Q8. F Q9. F Q10. T
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Notes: These notes appeared on the screen if a participant answered wrongly any of the
previous questions.
Q1. Treatment 0.6: Your unit cost is different from the unit cost of other participants but
it is related. Treatment 0: Your unit cost is different from the unit cost of other participants.
There is no relation between your unit cost and that of other participants.
Q2. In each round, the unit cost is random and independent from the unit cost of past and
future rounds.
Q3. Treatment 0.6: The higher your unit cost, the higher the unit cost of the other sellers
will tend to be. Treatment 0: There is no relation between your unit cost and that of other
participants. Therefore, if my unit cost is high, I can not deduce anything from the unit cost
of the other participants.
Q4. Unit costs between 1000 and 1200 occur with higher frequency than unit costs between
1000 and 700.
Q5. The unit cost of 1000 is the most frequent one. Unit costs larger than 1000 occur with
the same frequency as unit costs smaller than 1000.
Q6. Errors larger than 0 occur with the same frequency as errors smaller than 0.
Q7. An error of 0 is the most frequent error.
Q8. Profit does not only depend on the number of units sold. Remember that: Profit =
(MarketPrice− UnitCost)UnitsSold− 1.5UnitsSold2.
Q9. Treatment 0.6: The lower your unit cost, the lower the unit cost of the other sellers
will tend to be. Treatment 0: There is no relation between your unit cost and that of other
participants. Therefore, if my unit cost is high, I can not deduce anything about the unit cost
of the other participants.
Q10. The market price is the same for all units and sellers in a market.
A.3. Screenshots
The screens have been translated from Spanish to English.
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Screen 1: signal screen
Screen 2a: decision screen before entering Offer Prices
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Screen 2b: example of a decision screen after entering Offer Prices
Screen 3: feedback about a seller’s own performance1
1During the experiment the computer performs mathematical operations to calculate revenue, production
costs, transaction costs and profits. For these calculation we use all available decimals. However, we show all
the variables rounded to whole numbers, except from 1.5UnitsSold.
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Screen 4: feedback about market performance and other sellers’ in the
same market
A.4 Post-experiment questionnaire
In the all the treatments, after the rounds were completed, we asked for 3 demographic questions:
age, gender and degree studying. We then asked the following additional questions regarding
understanding of the game.
1. Do you think that a high market price generally means GOOD/MIXED/BAD news about
the level of your costs?
2. Explain your answer.
3. Do you think that the other sellers have answered the same as you to the previous question?
4. Explain your answer.
In the supplementary treatments TUH and TCH, we also asked students for their Univer-
sity Access Test score and asked them to complete the Cognitive Reflection Test. See Online
Appendix D.2.
B. Calculations of the main indicators of market power: the-
oretical and empirical
Here we discuss the theoretical indicators of behavior and market power.
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The supply function has the form X(si, p) = b−asi+cp. Vives (2011) shows that the model
described in Section 2 has a unique symmetric linear supply function equilibrium (SFE), where
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The Lerner index (interim) is calculated at the market level and it corresponds to formula (3)





























where π̃(t; d) = 1
n
∑
i πi(t; d), t=(E [θ1 | s] , E [θ2 | s] , ..., E [θn | s]), and s = (s1, s2, ..., sn). The
first term of (7) corresponds to expected profits at the average quantity, and the second term
is related to the dispersion of the predicted values.
These indicators were empirically implemented as follows to analyze the results of the ex-
periment.
From any participant’s two-dimensional choice, we can infer the (inverse) supply function
parameters: SlopePQ = AskPrice2−AskPrice1, and InterceptPQ = AskPrice1− SlopePQ.
The empirical counterpart of price impact takes into account that subjects may submit
different supply functions from rivals. At a given round, for each subject i, we compute the
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inverse of the sum of the supply function slopes of a subject’s rivals in a given market, that is,





where cj is the supply function slope of rival j and ck is the supply function slope of rival k.
The market price is computed by solving the following equation: q =
∑n
i=1X(si, p), where
X(si, p) are the supply functions submitted by the subjects during the experiment.






i θi − λ(q/n)
p
. (9)
Profits are calculated ex-post using: πi = (p− θi)xi − λ2x
2
i .
Appendix C. Additional empirical results
This section includes the analysis of all the rounds of the experiment (C.1), time trends (C.2),
results of the panel regressions (C.3), and details of the heterogeneity of behaviour and mixture
models (C.4).
C.1. Analysis of all the rounds of the experiment
Here we analyse behavior and market power in all the rounds of the principal treatments [1,25].
Note that in the main text we only present rounds [1,18] for comparability with the supple-
mentary treatments TUH and TCH, which only had 18 rounds.
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Table 1: Average market power during the last 5 rounds in each treatment.
Note. The second row after each variable in brackets and italics is the standard deviation (s.d.). The unit
of analysis for price impact, supply function and profit is the individual choice in each round (there are 1,800
observations in each treatment except for price impact since it is not defined for 54 observations in the TUL and
45 in the TCL because of a null denominator). For the Lerner index and market price, the unit of analysis is
the market with 600 in each treatment (in the TUL the Lerner index is not defined for 1 observation that as a
market price equal to zero).
We obtain the same conclusions as in the paper when testing for equality of the various
indicators of market power between both treatments using all the 25 rounds: price impact
(p-value=0.423); Lerner index (p-value=0.873); supply function slope (p-value=0.337); supply
function intercept (p-value=0.749); market price (p-value=0.749); and profits (p-value=0.522).
The table and the tests show we cannot reject that average market power is the same in TUL
and TCL. These results confirm the previous findings presented in the paper with all periods.
C.2. Time trends
The following graph shows the time trends in price impact and the Lerner index in both treat-
ments.
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Figure 1: Time trends in price impact and the Lerner index in each of the treatments.
In terms of price impact, we observe that market power is greatest in TCL compared to
TUL in all periods, and that there is a slight downward trend over time (perhaps reflecting the
fact that subjects are adapting their behavior to the average behavior of others). In terms of
the Lerner index, in TUL there are two rounds with very low Lerner indices (both in the first
five rounds). This is because there are subjects that bid very low in the beginning as part of
their learning process. For the other rounds, there does not seem to be much difference in the
Lerner index between rounds and treatments.
C.3. Panel regressions
Table 2 reports the results of the regressions accompanying the results of Section 5.2 and 6.1
of the paper, and Table 3 the corresponding ones for Section 5.3. They report the results of
two random effects panel regression with the dependent variables price impact and Lerner index
on a constant, the treatment dummy (D_TCL is 1 in TCL, and 0 in TUL), the private signal
(Signal), and the round number (Round). The unit of analysis for the price impact regression
is the participant across rounds, while for the Lerner index it is a given market across rounds.
We cluster standard errors at the independent group level.
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Table 2: Panel regressions of the indicators of market power on a the treatment dummy and
controls
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Results of the panel regressions
correspond to random effects with robust standard errors are clustered at the independent group level and are
given in parentheses.
To obtain the p-values presented in Tables 4 and 7 of the paper, we conduct post-estimation
t-tests of the equality of the regression coefficient (the “constant” for TUL and “constant
+D_TCL” for TCL) with the prediction hypothesized by the SFE (shown in Table 2 of the
paper) or by the alternative benchmarks (shown in Table 6 of the paper), respectively.
Table 3 reports the results of the regressions supporting the result in Section 5.3. We present
the result of random effects panel regressions where the unit of analysis is the individual across
rounds. We cluster standard errors at the independent group level. We run two regressions with
two dependent variables: SlopePQ and InterceptPQ in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The
explanatory variables are a treatment dummy (D_TCH is 1 in TCL, and 0 in TUL), and the
private signal (Signal).
Table 3: Sensitivity of the supply function slope and intercept to the private signal.
Notes. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Results of the panel regressions
correspond to random effects with robust standard errors are clustered at the independent group level and are
given in parentheses.
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The results are explained in Section 5.3 of the text. We ran additional regressions with the
interaction term between the signal and the treatment dummy and these are non-significant in
none of the regressions.
Table 2 reports the results of the regressions accompanying the results of Section 5.2 and
6.1. They report the results of two random effects panel regression with the dependent variables
price impact and Lerner index on a constant, the treatment dummy (D_TCL is 1 in TCL, and
0 in TUL), the private signal (Signal), and the round number (Round). The unit of analysis
for the price impact regression is the participant across rounds, while for the Lerner index it is
a given market across rounds. We cluster standard errors at the independent group level.
C.4. Heterogeneity of behaviour and mixture model
In this sub-section, we use price impact as measure of market power for analysing the heterogen-
eity in individual choices. To go one step further in our analysis of heterogeneity, we estimate
a finite mixture model. We use the individual measure of price impact in each treatment, and
assume that they are i.i.d. and generated by a normal distribution with mean γjt which is
equal to the prediction of a particular benchmark j at round t, and variance σj, which is a free
parameter.
The theoretical benchmarks that we use to estimate the mixture model are the SFE, IN, PT
and PTIN, which have been discussed in Section 6.1. A finite mixture model allows each seller
to use one of the benchmarks just described. Denote Pj the probability that any seller uses
the j benchmark, where j ∈ {SFE, IN, PT, PTIN} benchmark, such that
∑
j Pj = 1. The








where f(dit|j) is the conditional probability that subject i in round t chooses dit given that it
follows benchmark j. Recall that for the uncorrelated costs treatment, the PT and SFE are
identical to the PTIN and IN respectively.
The sample log-likelihood in each treatment is then logL =
∑n
i log(Li). Table 4 reports the
maximum likelihood results for the general mixture model in each treatment. In addition to
estimating the general model for each treatment, we have tested whether any of the possible
nested models might provide a more parsimonious representation of the heterogeneity of our
choices. Results of likelihood ratio tests (at the 1% level) favour the most general model which
allows all benchmarks to be present in each treatment.
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimation for the general mixture models in each of the principal
treatments.
Notes. The likelihood is computed using price impact for periods [1,18] for all participants in each treatment,
thus there are 1,296 observations in each treatment.
The results of the previous table are explained in the main text at the end of Section 6.1.
Appendix D. Analysis of participants’ demographic and cog-
nitive information
D.1. Demographics
We briefly analyse the demographics of participants in each treatment (72 subjects)- age and
gender, where gender is equal to 1 if the subject is a male and 0 if female. In addition, for TUH
and TCH, we asked participants to report their percentage score on the Spanish University
Access Test.
Table 5: Demographics in each treatment.
Note. The number of participants in each treatment is equal to 72.
We find that there are no differences among treatments in age and gender and found no
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statistical difference (Pearson χ2 tests: p-value=0.833 for age, and p-value=0.931 for gender),
and also we cannot reject that there are no differences in the scores for the university access
test between treatments TUH and TCH (t-test, p-value=0.236).
D.2. Cognitive Reflection Test in TUH and TCH
In order to disentangle whether there were differences in subjects’ cognitive abilities between
treatments, we conducted the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005), hereafter CRT, at the
end of the experiment for treatments TUH and TCH.2 The question of the CRT are as follows:
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? _____ cents; (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes; (3) In a lake, there is
a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to
cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____
days. We incentivised participants with 0.5 Euros per correct answer.
Table 6: Results of the CRT in each of the two treatments.
With a two-sample t-test, we find that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean of the
CRT is the same in the two treatments (p-value=0.166). In addition, we conducted regressions
of market power on the number of correct answers in the CRT test in each treatment. We found
that, in each of the two treatments, the number of correct answers in the CRT is not a predictor
of price impact (p-value=0.733 in the TUH, p-value=0.589 in the TCH) or the supply function
slope (p-value=0.646 in the TUH, p-value=0.869 in the TCH).
Appendix E. Further analysis of the noisiness of the private
signal
In an additional treatment we investigate whether an extreme increase in the noisiness of the
private signal in relation to the noisiness of the fundamental affects the competitiveness of
2In treatments TUL and TCL we did not collect data for the CRT.
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markets. We conducted a treatment with correlation ρ = 0.175 and φ = 3600 (hereafter
TCHH), in which the private signal is practically uninformative. Treatment TCHH can be then
easily compared with treatment TCH (that has ρ = 0.175 and φ = 36). The SFE predicts that
the TCHH is slightly less competitive than treatment TCH, with a theoretical price impact of
dSFE = 13.49 (an increase of 0.97 in price impact due to an increase in the variance ratio by
a factor of 100). We ran the TCHH treatment with 72 participants, which had 6 independent
groups of 12 sellers each. The experimental procedures were identical to those of the main
experiment, described in Section 5. Table 7 displays the market power and information friction
results in the TCHH treatment.
Table 7: Market power and information frictions in the TCHH treatment, and comparisons.
Note. The first row shows the average, while the second in brackets and italics is the standard deviation (s.d.).
The number of observations in each treatment is 1,800.
We find that average market power is slightly larger in the TCHH treatment than in the
TCH treatment, however, when tested formally, we find that the two treatments have the same
degree of market power (p = 0.200, Mann-Whitney rank-sum test where the unit of observation
is the independent group).
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